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Sacred values 
If the Middle East peace process is to be salvaged, Israelis and Palestinians must 
make symbolic concessions. But time is running out. 
By Scott Atran 
Web Exclusive   © 2006 Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists
amas leader and 
Palestinian Prime 
Minister Ismail Haniya 
seems to understand 
that to stop his people's 
suffering, his 
government must 
forsake his party's all-
or-nothing call for 
Israel's destruction. 
"We have no problem 
with a sovereign 
Palestinian state over 
all our lands within the 
‘67 borders, living in 
calm," Haniya told me 
in his Gaza City office in 
late June, shortly 
before it was destroyed 
in an Israeli missile attack, "but we need the West as a partner to help us 
through." Haniya's government recently agreed to a historic compromise with 
rival Fatah leader, Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas, to form a national 
coalition that implicitly allows for the coexistence of a Palestinian state alongside 
Israel, following the 1967 borders. But news of this breakthrough was quickly 
superseded by Israel's offensive in the Gaza Strip in retaliation for the kidnapping
of an Israeli soldier by Palestinian militants, including members of Hamas's 
military wing. 
Many Israelis consider the rescue of a captured soldier as a "sacred value" to be 
achieved at any cost, but the underlying strategic goal is to destroy whatever 
potential the Hamas government has to block Israel from unilaterally redrawing 
its international boundaries--a move Israel intends to undertake as soon as it can
convince the United States that there is no Palestinian partner to negotiate with. 
Despite Israel's massive response, Khaled Meshaal, the Damascus-based head of 
the Hamas political bureau, refused the soldier's release unless Israel also freed 
hundreds of prisoners. Meshaal undoubtedly intended to leverage Israel's sacred 
value; in the past, Israel has been willing to compensate enemies like Hezbollah 
with the release of hundreds of Palestinian detainees in return for a single Israeli.
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But according to one of Abbas's senior advisers, Meshaal has other mundane 
concerns: "He has repeatedly tried to undermine the Haniya government's 
authority to negotiate by presenting himself as Hamas's true decision maker, and
he will not be remembered as the person who legitimized Israel and sacrificed 
sacred land." 
Haniya's more moderate pitch to Western governments comes down to "we need 
you, as you need us." He has asked that Americans and Europeans end their 
sanctions against his government and recognize that the Arab and Muslim world 
see Hamas's election to power as a genuine exercise in democracy. Engaging his 
government, Haniya says, would be the best opportunity for the Bush 
administration to reverse the steep decline of the United States in the esteem of 
Arabs and Muslims everywhere.
Indeed, in a June survey by the Pew Center's Global Attitudes Project, Muslim 
opinions about the West worsened over the past year by overwhelming margins, 
and many commentators, including former Republican Sen. John Danforth and 
former secretary of state Madeleine Albright, believe that a "dialogue of 
civilizations" is pressing. Khurshid Ahmad, a senator in Pakistan and the leader of
Jamaat-e-Islami, one of the world's oldest and most important Islamist 
movements, concurs. In Islamabad, he recently told me that if the Hamas 
government accepts a two-state solution, "with both Palestine and Israel having 
full economic, political, and military sovereignty over their pre-1967 territories, 
and with Palestinians allowed into Palestine and Jews into Israel, then I would 
recommend this solution to the entire Muslim Ummah [community]." Given 
prevailing stereotypes, this is a remarkable statement by a self-proclaimed 
"Islamic fundamentalist" who considers such a solution key to bridging and 
narrowing the otherwise widening gulf between Muslim and Western societies and
to marginalizing Al Qaeda. 
For their part, Israeli officials acknowledge that the Hamas-Fatah accord is a 
positive trend, but do not see it as a turning point. "We have no reason to trust 
Hamas," says Isaac Ben Israel, one of Israel's top military strategists who 
currently heads the country's space agency. "And if they persist in attacking us 
across the Green Line we will physically destroy their government and make 
those [who] elected them pay the price." Ben Israel, like other officials I spoke 
with, does not make any strategic distinction between moderate and hardline 
Hamas factions.
To change its policy, Israel requires practical steps from Hamas, such as 
abandoning all attacks on its territory and renouncing its own sacred values--
notably the "right of return" of Palestinian refugees and their descendants to go 
back to former homes within Israel. Hamas government spokesman Ghazi Hamad
also speaks of good-faith gestures, observing that "Israel releasing some of our 
prisoners may help us to try to stop others from attacking it."  
Such symbolic concessions might ultimately prove more important than material 
trade-offs in making peace. Unfortunately, time is running out for talking or even 
thinking about these broader issues: Israel, the United States, and Europe will 
not end their isolation of the Hamas government unless it formally recognizes 
Israel's legitimacy and clamps down on Palestinian militants. But even 
Palestinians acknowledge that Hamas's Damascus-based political bureau has 
more sway over Hamas's military wing than does the Haniya government, thus 
potentially undermining any possible conciliatory government gestures. Meshaal 
has emerged the winner in past clashes with Haniya. Both, for instance, initially 
agreed that Hamas would participate in the 1995 Palestinian legislative elections, 
but Meshaal changed his mind at the last minute and threatened to cut off Haniya
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and other candidates from Hamas if they ran. Haniya withdrew his candidacy and 
left Hamas. It was only after Israel's 1997 release of Hamas founder Sheikh 
Ahmad Yassin, in exchange for two Mossad agents caught in a botched attempt to
poison Meshaal in Jordan, that Haniya became Yassin's bureau chief and rejoined 
Hamas.
Moreover, Meshaal, who receives protection from Damascus and who has been 
courting Iran for money, can also count on Lebanon's Hezbollah for support. 
Hezbollah's cross-border raid that captured two Israeli soldiers strikingly 
resembled the earlier attack by Palestinian militants that captured Israel's Cpl. 
Gilad Shalit. Israel now aims to reestablish the country's security and military 
credibility on both the Gaza and Lebanese fronts. But from a strategic 
perspective, Hezbollah represents a clearer target than Hamas--other than Syria, 
Sunni Arab countries have no love for Shiite Hezbollah and its Iranian sponsors--
and this may actually relieve some of Israel's pressure on Hamas. 
Although Haniya and many other local Hamas leaders are not altogether happy 
with the loose coalition that Meshaal has been forging with Syria, Iran, and 
Hezbollah, they say that as long as Israel, the United States, and Europe continue
to isolate and starve the Hamas government there is little choice but to accept 
whatever help comes their way. 
At present, Haniya has one advantage: He is Palestine's most popular man. Fatah
leaders credit him with shrewdly managing the Hamas election campaign, which 
emphasized honest government on the model of Hamas's well-run social services 
in contrast to Fatah's corruption and minimized calls for Israel's destruction. Avi 
Dichter, Israel's minister in charge of internal security who is currently engaged 
in informal talks with Hamas, describes Haniya as "likable" and willing to 
negotiate. And Haniya is now becoming beloved by the people in the same way 
that Yasir Arafat was because he is the only leader who has come out of hiding to 
visit families stricken by the Israeli offensive, often arriving at the same time as 
the ambulances and aid workers any time of day or night.  
In the eyes of some, though, Haniya's popularity comes back to bite him. When 
Haniya laments that Gaza is out of control and that he can do little to stop the 
mess, Israeli strategists like Ben Israel point out that Haniya, who received 
almost 70 percent of the vote in Gaza, has the popular backing to challenge the 
hardline exile-leadership in Damascus. But since he can't--or won't--Haniya's 
popularity is seen as an obstacle to an agreement, just as it was with Arafat. 
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